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California Expands Tort Liability Under
the Novel "Market Share" Theory:
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
The California Supreme Court, in the novel and unprecedented case of
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, eliminated the plaintiffs burden of identifi-
cation of a negligent party, and thus the causation requirement, in a multi-
ple party tort action. In the course of this decision, the court adopted the
"market share" theory of liability which dictated in Sindell that noniden-
ti able defendant-manufacturers of the generic drug DES would be liable
for the damages in proportion to their share of business in the market. The
author thoroughly examines various theories of recovery, such as "alterna-
tive liability," "concert of action" and "enterprise liability," which the
court employed in their formulation of the 'market share" theory. While in
agreement with this decision, the author analyzes the majority and dissent-
ing opinions and notes the benefits and shortcomings of this most contro-
versial development in California tort law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the vast majority of women who had developed
cancer due to their mother's ingestion of the drug diethys-
tilbestrol (DES)' during pregnancy were unable to recover dam-
ages because of their inability to identify the responsible
manufacturer. However, the California Supreme Court, in Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories,2 has pioneered a new theory of recovery
which permits a DES daughter 3 to recover damages without nam-
ing a specific manufacturer-defendant. This four to three deci-
sion 4 will likely have far-reaching consequences in the field of
1. Although diethystilbestrol is the most common trade name associated with
the term DES, this generic drug, along with several closely-related congeners, was
manufactured and sold under approximately 60 different trade names between
1947 and 1971. OLIVAs, FACT SHEET ON DES DAUGHTERS 8 (1978) (unpublished
manuscript).
2. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
3. The drug DES manifests its injury-producing qualities not in the mothers
who ingest it, but in their offspring. See notes 10-16 infra and accompanying text.
Since the majority of cases thus far have involved the female offspring of these
mothers, the potential plaintiffs have been popularly termed "DES daughters."
However, the term, as used in this casenote refers to all of the offspring of DES
users, whether male or female.
4. Justice Mosk wrote the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Bird and Asso-
ciate Justices Newman and White concurring. The dissent was authored by Jus-
tice Richardson, joined by Justice Clark and Justice Manuel.
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products liability by in effect removing causation in certain situa-
tions as a required element of proof.
Before discussing the significance of Sindell with regard to the
expansion of manufacturer's liability, the special nature of DES
cases will be noted. Next, both the history and the court's treat-
ment of each theory of applicable established tort law will also be
discussed, in addition to a review of the market share theory,5
adopted by the Sindell court. Finally, both the advantages and
drawbacks of the market share theory, and its potential impact on
future cases in the field of products liability will be analyzed.
II. THE FACTS
A. DES
DES, a synthetic compound of the female hormone estrogen,
was approved on an experimental basis6 in 1947 as a miscarriage
preventative. DES was manufactured, promoted, and marketed
from 1947 to 1971 by hundreds of drug companies, 7 including the
respondents in Sindell.8 In 1971, as a result of statistical data
showing a significant correlation between the use of DES and the
subsequent development of cancer in the daughters of mothers
who took the drug during pregnancy, 9 the FDA banned the use of
5. This new theory of liability advanced by the Sindell court will be defined
and discussed in notes 107-25 infra and accompanying text.
6. Although the FDA authorized the marketing of DES as a miscarriage pre-
ventive, it required that the drug contain a warning label to describe its experi-
mental nature. Instead, the defendants marketed DES on an unlimited and wide-
open basis as a miscarriage preventative without warning as the experimental na-
ture of the drug. Appellant's Additional Brief at 9, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sindell,
Appellant's Brief].
7. The exact number of companies that actually manufactured DES for use
during pregnancy is uncertain. In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289
N.W.2d 20 (1979), the defendants produced affidavits showing that more than 300
companies were offering DES for sale during the relevant time period. However,
this number includes distributors and packagers who did not actually manufac-
ture DES. An FDA computer printout shows 94 companies for which the FDA ap-
proved a New Drug Application (NDA) for DES use for the prevention of
miscarriages. However, this printout does not include those companies which
started to market DES after it was no longer classified as a new drug, nor does it
include information on manufacturers of drugs manufactured simultaneously with
DES, or drugs having the same purpose and effect as DES. Thus, it may be esti-
mated that the number of actual manufacturers is between 94 and 300. Sheiner,
DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 963, 964
n.3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fordham Comment].
8. The named defendants were Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company,
E.R. Squibb and Sons, the Up-John Company, and Rexall Drug Company.
9. In 1971, Dr. Arthur Herbst and colleagues at Massachusetts General Hospi-
tal reported eight cases of primary clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina in wo-
men 15-22 years of age. It was determined that seven out of eight of the mothers
of these patients had taken DES during the first five months of pregnancy. The
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the drug for the purpose of preventing miscarriages,10 because of
its danger" and ineffectiveness.' 2
eighth had taken dinestrol and estrone, drugs similar to DES. This was the first
documented link between cancer and DES usage. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer,
Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 N. ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971). Subsequent stud-
ies by other authorities have confirmed this finding. See Nordquist, Fidler, Wood-
ruff & Lewis, Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Cervix and Vagina, 37 CANCER 858
(1976).
More recent studies have associated DES exposure to a variety of other abnor-
malities. See, e.g., Bibbo, Gill, Friedoon, Blough, Fang, Rosenfield, Schumacher,
Sleeper, Sonck and Wied, Follow-up Study of Male and Female Offsrping of DES-
Exposed Mothers, 49 J. Am. C. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Bibbo] (general genital abnormalities and low sperm density in DES-exposed
males); Fowler and Edelman, In Utero Exposure to DES, 51 Am. J. OBSTET. &
GYNEc. 459 (1978) (higher risk of DES-exposed females developing squamous neo-
plasia); Barnes, Colton, Gundersen, Noller, Telly, Strama, Townsend, Halib and
O'Brien, Fertility and Outcome of Pregnancy in Women Exposed in Utero to Dieth-
yistilbestrol, 302 N. ENG. J. MED. 609 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Barnes] (in-
creased risk of infertility and unfavorable outcome of pregnancy associated with
DES exposure).
10. The prevention of miscarriages is just one of the marketing uses of DES.
It is still used in the treatment of women for menopausal disturbances, senile vag-
initis, and the relief of breast engorgement during lactation suppression. Men are
treated with DES for cancer of the prostate. DES is still prescribed by some phy-
sicians as a post-coital contraceptive, commonly known as the "morning-after" pill.
And, until banned as an animal feed in 1979, DES was used to increase weight
gain in livestock. 22 ENVIRONMENT 35 (1980). For a complete list of the most recent
uses of DES, see PHYsiciANs' DESK REFERENCE 1033 (34th ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as P.D.R.].
11. The FDA took the following steps in regard to the dangers of DES:
1. All manufacturers of DES or closely related congeners (dianestrol, hex-
estrol, benzestrol, promethestrol) are being notified that appropriate
changes will be required in the labeling for such drugs. This change will
consist in the listing of pregnancy as a contraindication to the use of di-
ethylstilbestrol and the other above-mentioned compounds. 2. All other
estrogens will be required to have the following WARNING in their label-
ing-'A statistically significant association has been reported between ma-
ternal ingestion during pregnancy of diethylstilbestrol and the occurrence
of vaginal carcinoma developing years later in the offspring. Whether
such an association is applicable to all estrogens is not known at this time.
In any event, estrogens are not indicated for use during pregnancy.' 3. Ep-
idemiological studies are being initiated to determine the true incidence
of this disease in young women.., and the probability of a cause-and-
effect relationship.
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG AD., DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WEL., DRUG BULL., DIEmTHYL-
STILBESTROL CONTRAINDICATED IN PREGNANCY (Nov., 1971). For the most recent
contraindications for DES, see P.D.R., supra note 10, at 1032-33.
12. DES was first purported to help maintain high risk pregnancies in the
1940's, as the result of two poorly conducted and relatively uncontrolled studies re-
ported in obstetrical literature, Karnaky, The Use of Stilbestrol for the Treatment of
Threatened and Habitual Abortion and Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report,
35 S. MED. J. 838 (1942); and Smith, Diethylstilbestrol in the Prevention and Treat-
ment of Complications of Pregnancy, 56 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEc. 821 (1948) [here-
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Presently, several hundred young women whose mothers in-
gested DES during pregnancy are suffering from a DES-induced
cancer 13 known as clear cell adenocarcinoma. Heretofore a rela-
tively rare form of cancer14 "it is believed to strike after a mini-
mum latent period of 10 to 12 years"' 5 and generally appears in
the vagina, cervix and uterus. The vast majority of DES daugh-
ters who have not developed cancer are suffering from other ab-
normalities, the most prevalent being adenoses.16
inafter cited as Smith]. These early studies were soon discredited by subsequent
studies that showed no beneficial effects in the use of DES by women threatened
by miscarriage. See, e.g., Goldzieher and Benigno, The Treatment of Threatened
and Recurrent Abortion: A Critical Review, 75 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 1207
(1958); Davis and Fug, Steroids In the Treatment of Early Pregnancy Complica-
tions, 142 J.A.M.A. 778 (1950); Dieckmann, Davis, Kynkiewicz and Pottinger, Does
the Administration of Diethylstilbestrol During Pregnancy Have Therapeutic Val-
ues?, 66 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 1062 (1953). Despite these studies, DES contin-
ued to be manufactured and prescribed for the prevention of miscarriages until
1971: See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
13. It has been estimated that between .5 and 2 million women used the drug
DES between the years 1947 and 1971. Bruck, Defense Lawyers Fight Over Strat-
egy As Massive DES Battle Heats Up, AM. LAw, Feb. 1979, at 16 [hereinafter cited
as Bruck]. A survey of 12 hospitals between 1959 and 1965 showed that between
1.8 % to 2.67 % of all pregnant women hospitalized were given DES. Records of
two pharmaceutical surveys show that there may have been up to 50,000 females a
year, between 1960 and 1970, that were exposed to DES in utero. Heinonen,
Diethylstibestrol in Pregnancy, 31 CANCER 573 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hei-
nonen]. The total number of cancer victims among DES daughters has been esti-
mated to be between 1.4 and four in 1,000. Bruck, supra, at 16. However, recent
medical studies estimate the risk as being between 0.14 and 1.4 per 1,000 DES-ex-
posed females, with the peak age-incidence being age 19. Herbst, DES-Associated
Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina and Cervix, 34 OBSTET. & GYNEC. SuR-
vEY 844 (1979).
14. Prior to the link between DES and cancer, there had only been three re-
ported cases ever of clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina; clear-cell adenocarci-
noma of the cervix was also very rare. Ulfelder, The Stilbestrol-Adenosis-Carcinoa
Syndrome, 38 CANCER 426, 428 (1976).
15. Sindell, Appellant's Brief, supra note 6, at 9.
16. The Sindell court defined adenosis as "precancerous vaginal and cervical
growths which may spread to other parts of the body ... treatment [of which is]
in cauterization, surgery or cyrosurgery." 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 133.
Proof that DES is a cause of adenosis in females is well-documented. See For-
sberg, Cervicovaginal Epithelium-Its Origin and Development, 115 AM. J. OBSTET.
& GYNEc. 322 (1973). However, one authority has stated that adenosis can arise de
novo in any female. Sandberg, The Incidence and Distribution of Occult Vaginal
Adenosis, 101 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 322 (1968), and Dr. Herbst of Massachusetts
General Hospital has shown that adenosis has occurred in a controlled population
not exposed to DES. Herbst, Poskanzer, Robboy, Friedander and Scully, Prenatal
Exposure to Stilbestrol, 292 N. ENG. J. MED. 334 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Herbst]. Thus, it appears that adenosis may have multiple origins.
For other potential abnormalities that have been found in DES daughters, see
Sandberg, Benign Cervical and Vaginal Changes Associated with Exposure to Stil-
bestrol in Utero, 125 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 777 (1976); Bibbo, note 9 supra.
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B. The Facts in Sindell
The appellant,'7 Judith Sindell, filed suit 18 against several drug
companies1 9 for personal injuries sustained as a result of prenatal
exposure to DES. Sindell sued on her own behalf and as repre-
sentative of a class of other women in California similarly situ-
ated.2 0
The Sindell case is just one of many actions that has been
brought in recent years by DES daughters, 21 most of whom have
17. Sindell is actually a companion case with Rogers v. Rexall Drug Co., 26
Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). Although the cases were consoli-
dated on appeal, the court's decision refers to Ms. Sindell, and only discusses the
allegations in her complaint. This casenote will likewise refer to only Ms. Sindell.
18. The plaintiff's original complaint alleged 10 causes of action, each of which
are claimed to have arisen from the defendants acting individually and in concert
in the manufacture and marketing of DES. The causes of action are as follows:
negligence, strict liability in tort, lack of informed consent, breach of express war-
ranty, breach of implied warranty, fraud, violation of federal law, joint enterprise,
conspiracy, and certain limited class relief actions.
19. The plaintiff's original complaint named ten defendants, five of which,
Boyle Drug Co., Merck, Sharp & Dohme Orthopedics Co., Inc., Miles Laboratories,
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., and Parke Davis & Co., were dismissed for various
reasons before appeal, leaving five remaining defendants. See note 6 supra.
20. The plaintiff class consisted of "girls and women who are residents of Cali-
fornia and who have been exposed to DES before birth and who may or may not
know that fact or the dangers to which they were exposed." 26 Cal. 3d at 593 n.1,
607 P.2d at 925 n.1, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 132 n.1. Defendants were also sued as repre-
sentatives of a class of drug manufacturers which sold DES after 1941. Id.
The complaints of both Sindell and Rogers, which were substantially the same,
alleged that the prerequisites for maintaining these class actions were met. Thus,
the appellate court refrained from discussing the potentially complicated class ac-
tion issues in its opinion. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1 n.1, 149
Cal. Rptr. 138, 141 n.1 (1978). For a discussion of the potential legal problems in-
volved with class action certification, see note 31 infra.
21. Most of these suits are still pending. Of those that have been decided, the
majority have resulted in judgments for the defendants because of the inability of
the plaintiffs to identify the manufacturer of the DES prescribed to their mothers.
26 Cal. 3d at 597, 607 P.2d at 927-28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36. See Rheingold v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 74 Civil 3420 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975); Gray v.
United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Fields v. Eli Lilly & Co., No.
C122248 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 1977); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77,
150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978); Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 3838 (76 N.Y. Sup.
Ct., filed March 1976).
Diamond v. E.R. Quibb & Sons, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. App. 1979), held that
the suit, brought 20 years after the plaintiffs mother took the DES, was barred by
the Florida statute of limitations, which prohibits actions more than 12 years after
the delivery of a product to the original purchaser, regardless of when the defect
was discovered.
In Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Laboratories, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185
(1979), the plaintiff, whose daughter died from clear cell adenocarcinoma of the
cervix due to her mother's exposure to DES, settled with the specific manufac-
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already developed clear cell adenocarcinoma. Sindell, as a result
of DES exposure, developed a malignant bladder tumor which
was surgically removed.22 She also continues to suffer from ade-
noses, which requires that she be frequently monitered by biopsy
or colposcopy to insure early warning of further malignancy.23
Among Sindell's allegations were that each defendant knew, or
should have known, that DES was carcinogenic at the time of its
manufacture and sale, and that the defendants acted in concert in
the manufacture and promotion of DES for the prevention of mis-
carriage without adequate testing or warning, and without moni-
toring or reporting its effects. 24 Sindell further alleged that each
defendant undertook a program to market DES on a "wide-open
basis" for the prevention of miscarriage, notwithstanding the fact
that it was only conditionally approved by the FDA25 and that
each defendant continued to market DES after learning of its car-
cinogenic properties. However, in her complaint, and subse-
qudntly throughout her trial and appeals, Sindell was unable to
name a specific manufacturer responsible for her injuries.
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the com-
plaint and dismissed the action, primarily because of Sindell's in-
ability to name the responsible manufacturer.26 On appeal, the
court of appeal reversed the trial court,27 finding a cause of action
turer, and continued his case against eleven other drug companies, alleging the
joint actions of the companies were the causes of his daughter's death. The court
held that "alternative liability" and "enterprise liability" were not applicable
where the plaintiff had knowledge of the particular brand of DES ingested.
Barros v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 75-1226 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1978) was one of
the first DES cases to go to trial and resulted in a verdict for the defendant. Al-
though the plaintiffs mother identified Squibb as the manufacturer of the DES
she ingested, the jury concluded that the identification was not sufficiently proven.
However, in Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979), the
Michigan Court of Appeals, after the lower courts granted summary judgment for
defendants, No. 74-030-070 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 1977) held that the plaintiffs
had a cause of action under the concert of action theory. This decision is pres-
ently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
There have been two recent jury verdicts for DES plaintiffs. In Needham v.
White Laboratories, No. 76 Cll01 (N.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 1979), the plaintiff was able
to produce records showing the responsible manufacturer and received a jury ver-
dict of $ 800,000.00 In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., Index 15600/74, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979),
a New York jury found for the plaintiff despite her inability to identify a specific
manufacturer, awarding her $500,000.00.
22. 26 Cal. 3d at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 976, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
23. Id.
24. Sindel, Appellant's Brief, supra note 6, at 8-10.
25. Id.
26. Sindell v. Boyle Drug Co., No. C169127 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977); Rogers v. Ab-
bott Labratories, No. 61220 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977).
27. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978);
Rogers v. Rexall Drug Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978).
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under both the alternative liability 28 and concert of action2 9 theo-
ries. The defendant's subsequent appeal resulted in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision which is the subject of this casenote.
C. The Issue Presented
Although many legal issues are involved in DES cases in gen-
eral, the Sindell court restricted its discussion to the following is-
sue: "May a plaintiff, injured as the result of a drug administered
to her mother during pregnancy, who knows the type of drug in-
volved but cannot identify the manufacturer of the precise prod-
uct, hold liable for her injuries a maker of a drug produced from
an identical formula?"30 The California Supreme Court believed
public policy required an extension of traditional products liabil-
ity doctrine to provide for an adequate remedy in such situations.
In order to accomplish this extension, the court adopted a novel
theory of liability in tort law.
Before discussing the Sindell court's analysis of this complex
legal issue, a brief explanation of the various theories of liability
which have permitted plaintiffs to recover despite the inability to
name a specific defendant is necessary.
III. CAUSATION
Although DES cases involve several legal problems, such as
class action certification,3 ' statute of limitations,3 2 possible ab-
28. For a complete definition and discussion of the alternative liability theory,
see notes 43-55 infra and accompanying text.
29. For a complete definition and discussion of the concert of action theory,
see notes 70-81 infra and accompanying text.
30. 26 Cal. 3d at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
31. Although several DES cases, like Sindell, are class actions, many have en-
countered difficulty with regard to their class action status. E.g., Rheingold v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 74 Civil 3420 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975); Stack v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. GD 77-05944 (Pa. Ct. C.P. June 30, 1977). The major prob-
lem encountered in DES class actions is the requirement for common questions of
law and fact among class members. See, FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Because of the individ-
ual questions of fact vary so greatly in products liability actions, class actions gen-
erally are not certified in these cases. Recently, however, some courts have
certified class actions for the determination of property damage in products liabil-
ity cases. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796 (1971); Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254
(1973); Metowski v. Traid Corp., 28 Cal. App. 3d 332, 194 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1972);
Landesman v. General Motors Corp., 42 Ill. App. 3d 363, 356 N.E. 2d 105 (1976).
Contra, Edelman v. Lee Optical Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 216, 320 N.E. 2d 517 (1974); Gil-
more v. General Motors Corp., 35 Ohio Misc. 36, 300 N.E. 2d 259 (1973). In the
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above cases that permitted class actions, the amount of damages was identical to
each member of the class.
Despite the general reluctance by most courts to certify class standing in per-
sonal injury and products liability cases, the Sindell court passed over the issue
completely in its finding for the plaintiff. See note 20 supra. In Payton v. Abbott
Laboratories, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), the district court granted the condi-
tional certification of a plaintiff class consisting of all women who were prenatally
exposed to DES in Massachusetts, were born in Massachusetts and domiciled
there when they received notice of the action and who had not developed uterine
or vaginal cancer. The court ruled that the plaintiff class was sufficient to meet the
requirements of FED. R. Crv. P. 23. However, the court denied the plaintiffs' mo-
tion to certify the manufacturers as a defendant class. In light of the Payton deci-
sion, not only DES plaintiffs, but plaintiffs in all product liability cases, may have a
better chance of maintaining class action suits.
32. The general rule in negligence actions is that the statute of limitations be-
gins to run when the cause of action accrues, which is held to be the time of in-
jury. BIRNBAUM, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND PRODUCTS LiABIury 1 (1979). Some
courts have applied this strict time of injury approach even though the plaintiff
might have been unaware of any injury. See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemi-
cal Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, amended 12 N.Y.2d 1073,
190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963). The New York
Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed the strict accrual of injury approach in a
strict liability case. Thornton v. Roosevelt Hospital, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920, 291 N.E.2d
1002 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979) (injury held to have occurred upon injection of drug al-
though the deleterious effects were nonexistent for almost twenty years). But cf.
McKee v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 404 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 1978)
(New York court held that time of diagnosis starts the running of the statute of
limitations unless the defendant can show that the plaintiff should have discov-
ered the nature of his disease earlier).
A more modern approach to the running of the statute of limitations in products
liability cases is the "discovery rule" approach, which dictates that the statute be-
gins running when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, his injury.
This was first used by the United States Supreme Court in Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163 (1949), and this is probably the majority rule today.
In drug and latent injury cases, the courts have decided in a variety of ways.
Some jurisdictions have adopted the restrictive view, holding that the discovery
rule does not apply. See Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550
(1974) (statute begins to run at the time the injury occurs, not when the plaintiff
discovers the cause of the injury). Other courts have held that the statute of limi-
tations begins to run when the facts giving rise to the cause of action are discov-
ered or should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Steiner v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 364 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Still other
courts have framed the discovery rule in terms of a causal relationship. The cause
of action accrues when the victim discovers or should have discovered the nature
and cause of the disability or impairment. Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,
394 A.2d 299 (Md. Ct. App. 1978) (an asbestos case where the cause of action did
not accrue until plaintiff ascertained the nature of the injury). The Harig rule was
adopted by the California Court of Appeals in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85
Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978). The degree of knowledge of causal rela-
tionship between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's product necessary for
an action to accrue has varied among jurisdictions. See, e.g., Burd v. New Jersey
Telephone Co., 76 N.J. 284, 386 A.2d 1310 (1978) (plaintiff was charged with con-
structive knowledge of a possible causal link between injury and exposure); Ray-
mond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170 (N.H. 1977) (statute of limitations did not
begin to run until a complete physical and causal link had been forged); Goodman
v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976) (statute began to run when the
injury itself was manifested, when the causal link between the injury and product
was ascertained, and when the actionable claim between the injury and the de-
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sence of a cause of action for fetal injury prior to viability,33 and
possible absence of a cause of action because the danger of the
drug was unknown at the time of manufacture,3 4 the Sindell court
saw the identification of the manufacturer, or causation issue, as
the major problem facing potential plaintiffs. 35
Because of the significant time lapse between the intake of the
DES, the manifestation of the injury, and the time period which
elapses before DES is discovered to be the causative agent, most
plaintiffs are unable to positively identify the specific manufac-
fendant's negligence was shown); Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 970 (5th
Cir. 1975) (while applying Texas law, the court held that only some evidence of
causal relationship is necessary for the statute of limitations to begin to run).
Many states have recently enacted so-called statutes of repose, which provide
for an outside limitation period that runs from the time the product left the manu-
facturer's possession or control. These statutes have the effect of limiting a manu-
facturer's liability for those products that have been on the market for several
years, or those products that have a long latent period before the injury is discov-
ered, such as DES. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 331-1-1.5 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25.224
(Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3708 (1980); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551
(1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977). The effect of these statutes of repose
was seen in Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), where the Florida statute, which provides that an action for products
liability must be brought within 12 years after the date of delivery of the product
to its original purchaser regardless of the date the defect was discovered, barred a
DES daughter from recovery.
33. All jurisdictions in the United States allow a cause of action for fetal in-
jury, however, the states are split as to whether or not to allow a cause of action
for prenatal injury prior to the viability of the fetus. For a list of jurisdictions on
both sides of the question, see 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, § 3(a)-(b) (1971 & Supp. 1980).
DES was recommended for use by pregnant women from the beginning of their
pregnancy through the end of their term. Smith, supra note 12, at 823-24. How-
ever, some women were treated on a short-term basis, usually within the first
three months of pregnancy, when there was the greatest chance of miscarriage.
See Heinonen, supra note 13, at 575. Thus, in those cases where the mother was
only treated with DES during the first few months of pregnancy, in those jurisdic-
tions that do not allow a cause of action for fetal injury prior to viability plaintiffs
may not be allowed to recover.
34. The negligence standard in products liability is based on the requirement
that liability for negligent behavior is imposed only when the risk is foreseeable.
Thus, in order to maintain a cause of action in a DES case, it is necessary for the
plaintiff to show that the risk was foreseeable to the manufacturer at the time of
manufacture.
As early as 1947, a substantial body of medical literature showed a connection
between the use of hormones and carcinogenic effects. Fordham Comment, supra
note 7, at 971 n.25. By 1947, oral administration of DES to laboratory animals had
been shown to produce cancer. Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177, 179 (7th Cir. 1966).
Thus, defendants were on notice of the potentially carcinogenic properties of DES,
as well as its ineffectiveness. See note 12 supra.
35. 26 Cal. 3d at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
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turer of the drug ingested by their mothers.3 6
The general rule in tort liability is that the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proof on the issue of causation 37 with the responsibility of
showing that his or her injuries were caused by the act of the de-
fendant or by an instrumentality under the defendant's control.
This rule applies whether the injury occurred as the result of an
accidental event38 or from the use of a defective product.3 9
There are several exceptions to this general rule, two of which
may be applicable to the Sindell situation. These two exceptions
are "concert of action" and "alternative liability."40 A third basis
of liability, "industry-wide" or "enterprise liability,"41 has also
been considered in the resolution of DES cases.42 All of these
theories, under certain circumstances, may support a plaintiff's
action even if the responsible defendant is not specifically named
or identified, and all were considered as possible solutions by the
Sindell court. Thus, each of these theories will be discussed in
detail before the adopted "market share" approach is analyzed.
36. Fordham Comment, supra note 7, at 972. This inability of DES plaintiffs to
positively identify the responsible manufacturer has resulted in summary judg-
ment at the pleading stage for several other DES defendants. See note 21 supra.
37. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 241 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule. See notes 40-41 infra
and accompanying text.
38. 26 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See, e.g., Shunk v.
Bosworth, 334 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1964) (res ipsa loquitur is not applicable where a
hunter is injured by one of two fellow hunter's shotgun pellets and where there is
no evidence of negligence).
39. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See, e.g., Wetzel v.
Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22, 29-30 (D. Minn. 1973) (no action for negligence against
two suppliers to the manufacturer of a defective tractor because no records were
available to prove that they were the negligent suppliers).
40. The other exceptions to this general rule are:
vicarious liability; common duty; concurrent causation of a single, indivisi-
ble result, which neither would have caused alone; concurrent causation
of a single, indivisible result, which either alone would have caused; suc-
cessive injuries; damage of the same kind, which is difficult to apportion;
and acts innocent in themselves which together cause damage.
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 429-42 (1937).
41. The term "enterprise liability" originated in Hall v. E. L Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F.Supp. 353, 376-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), and is sometimes used
broadly to mean that inquiries caused by an enterprise should be borne by it.
Klamme, Enterprise Theory of Torts, 47 COLO. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976). The term has
been loosely used in DES cases to refer to any of the theories expounded in Hall
which create joint and several liability when a plaintiff cannot justifiably identify a
specific manufacturer of the injury-producing drug. Birnbaum, Plaintiffs in DES
Suits Seek to Blame All Producers of Drugs, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 24, col. 1.
The theory of "enterprise liability" as the term is used in this casenote is more
precisely defined and discussed at notes 92-102 infra and accompanying text.
The Sindell court designated the "enterprise liability" theory by "the more accu-
rate term of 'industry-wide' liability." 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 136.
42. See note 21 supra, and Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149
Cal. Rptr. 138, 143 n.5 (1978).
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A. Alternative Liability
1. History
The unanimous decision of Summers v. Tice 43 best exemplifies
the theory that has been termed "double fault and alternative lia-
bility."44 This theory states that, where all defendants behave tor-
tiously, but the plaintiff is unable to identify the specific
defendant that causes his or her injury, the burden of proof is
shifted to each defendant to show that he is not the responsible
party.45 Where the defendants are unable to meet this burden,
joint and several liability results.4 6
In Summers, the plaintiff was injured when two hunters simul-
taneously and negligently fired their guns in the plaintiff's direc-
tion. The plaintiff could not ascertain which of the defendants
actually caused the injury, but the court nevertheless held that
both defendants were jointly and severally liable. The Summers
court refused to apply the concert of action theory,47 by stating
that to do so would be "straining that concept."48 The court devel-
oped instead the concept of alternative liability, based on the fol-
lowing policy consideration: if the plaintiff is forced to identify
the responsible defendant, there is the possibility that the wrong
defendant will be identified, conceivably leaving the injured plain-
tiff without a remedy.49 Because of this inequitable result, the
burden of proof should shift to the defendants, "each to absolve
himself if he can." 50
This rule of alternative liability developed by the Summers
court has been adopted by the Second Restatement of Torts. The
Restatement notes that the policy underlying the rule is "the in-
justice of permitting proved wrongdoers, who among them have
inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape
liability merely because the nature of their conduct and the re-
sulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of
43. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
44. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 243.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433B (3) (1965).
46. Id.
47. 33 Cal. 2d at 34, 199 P.2d at 3. For a discussion of the concert of action the-
ory, see notes 70-81 iqfra and accompanying text.
48. 33 Cal. 2d at 85, 199 P.2d at 3.
49. Id. at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4-5.
50. Id.
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them has caused the harm."5 1
In formulating the alternative liability theory, the Summers
court relied upon the celebrated case of Ybarra v. Spangard.52 In
Ybarra, the plaintiff sustained an injury while unconscious dur-
ing the course of surgery. The court decided that it would be an
unfair burden to require the plaintiff to identify the person or per-
sons who caused his injury, because his inability to identify the
specific causative factor was a direct result of actions of the de-
fendants. 53 Therefore, the court, by applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur5 4 found that an inference of negligence had arisen
that required the defendants to explain their conduct.55
2. Appellant's Reliance on Alternative Liability
In Sindell, the appellant placed primary reliance on the Sum-
mers and Ybarra decisions to show joint or alternative liability on
the part of the defendants. For example, the appellant main-
tained that the Ybarra decision went one step further than that
required of the court in a DES case.
In Ybarra the court may have actually shifted the burden of proof to an
entirely innocent non-negligent party. Here we are merely asking the
court to follow the doctrine elaborated in Summers and shift the burden of
proof to a group of defendants, each and every one of which is a negligent
cause of the plaintiff's inability to identify the specific wrongdoer causing
inJury.5 6
The appellant also attempted to compare the Summers fact sit-
uation to that of the DES-type of injury. For example, the appel-
lant pointed to the fact that the fungible nature of the shotgun
pellets in Summers was what made the identification of the re-
sponsible defendant virtually impossible.57 This was analogized
to the situation in Sindell, where the fungible nature of the ge-
neric drug DES made it difficult to prove without records which
respondent caused the harm to the appellant.58
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433B(3) (f) (1965) (Illustration 9 is pat-
terned after the Summers case).
52. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
53. Id.
54. Res Ipsa Loquitur has three necessary elements: "(1) the event must be of
a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2)
it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribu-
tion on the part of the plaintiff." PROSSER, supra note 37, at 214 (quoting 4 WiG-
MORE, EVIDENCE 2509 (1st ed. 1905)).
55. 26 Cal. 3d at 599, 607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
56. Sindell, Appellant's Brief, supra note 6, at 19.
57. Id. at 13.
58. The Sindell "[d]efendants maintain that the plaintiff is in a better position
... to identify the manufacturer because her mother might recall the name of the
prescribing physician or the hospital or pharmacy where the drug originated...
the brand or strength of the dosage, [or] the appearance of the medication." 26
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In Summers, the conduct which created the impossibility of
identification was the simultaneous discharge of the two defend-
ants' shotguns. However, in Sindell, the appellant argued that the
drug companies, by manufacturing the same drug under a variety
of trade names, created a situation in which it was unlikely that
any identification could be made. The appellant also contended
that the tortious character of the respondent's conduct in failing
to warn of, or discover, the dangers of DES was the major reason
why all parties failed to keep better records.5 9 Thus, the appellant
maintained that the DES injury was an even more compelling sit-
uation in which to find liability than that found in Summers.
In developing this theory, the plaintiff relied on Haft v' Lone
Palm Hotel.6 0 In Haft, multiple defendants were held liable for
the drowning of a young boy and his father in the hotel swimming
pool despite the absence of proof of causation. The defendants
were held to have been liable for negligence in failing to provide a
lifeguard as required by law. Even though there were no wit-
nesses to the accident, the Haft court held that the absence of ev-
idence of causation was a direct and foreseeable result of the
defendant's negligence, and on this basis, shifted the burden of
proof to the defendants.61 Similarly, the appellant in Sindell ar-
gued that her inability to identify the responsible manufacturer
was a direct and foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence
in their failure to warn consumers of the dangers of DES.62
3. Sindell Analysis of Alternative Liability
The Sindell court, in response to the respondent's allegation
that the appellant was in a superior position to identify the re-
sponsible manufacturer, stated that neither Sindell nor the drug
manufacturers were in a better position to bear the burden of
Cal. 3d at 601 n.3, 607 P.2d at 930 n.13, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.13. In some DES cases,
the plaintiff has been able to produce such records. For example, in Needham v.
White Laboratories, No. 76 Cll01 (N.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 1979), the plaintiffs' father
was the pharmacist who had filled the DES prescription and thus was able to pro-
duce the necessary records. However, in most DES cases, this information is not
so readily available due to the time span involved. For purposes of the appeal, the
court assumed that the appellant could not, as alleged in her complaint, make an
identification of the manufacturer fo the DES taken by her mother. 26 Cal. 3d at
601 n.13, 607 P.2d at 930 n.13, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.13.
59. Sindell, Appellants Brief, supra note 6, at 17-18.
60. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
61. 26 Cal. 3d at 601 n.14, 607 P.2d at 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
62. Sindell, Appellant's Brief, supra note 6, at 17-18.
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proof of identifying the responsible manufacturer.63
The respondents argued that the Summers-Ybarra burden of
proof rule was predicated on the defendant's greater access to in-
formation, and since this was not the case in Sindell, alternative
liability should not be applied. The court rejected this claim, not-
ing that while "Summers states that defendants are 'ordinarily
... in a far better position to offer evidence to determine which
one caused the injury' than a plaintiff," this is not necessarily a
prerequisite to the shifting of the burden of proof.64 The court be-
lieved that the particular circumstances in Sindell, as in most
DES cases, made it virtually impossible for either party to iden-
tify the specific wrongdoer.65
The court then distinguished the appellant's reliance on Haft.
The court stated that the difficulty or impossibility of the identifi-
cation of the specific responsible DES manufacturer was not, as
argued by the appellant, the result of the respondent's alleged
negligent act of failing to provide adequate warning. Rather, in
the view of the court, it was a result of the long passage of time
between the act, the ingesting and prenatal exposure to DES, and
the resulting subsequent development of cancer.66
The Summers theory of alternative liability was rejected by the
Sindell court for one major reason: the number of joined and un-
joined defendants. In Summers, all parties who were or could
have been responsible for the harm to the plaintiff were joined as
defendants. However, in Sindell, there were approximately 200
drug companies 67 that might have produced the injury-producing
drug that injured the appellant; of these, only five were ultimately
joined as defendants.
The court concluded that an application of the Summers rule to
Sindell would not be fair to the respondents. The possibility of
any of the respondents causing the injury to the appellant was too
63. 26 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 607 P.2d at 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
64. Id. at 600, 607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (citation omitted).
65. Id. The court accepted the plaintiff's assertion that she could not make an
identification. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. The court also stated
that the defendants could not trace the specific drug to determine the responsible
manufacturer because the drug manufacturers never had direct contact with the
patients who ingested their drug. Rather, the drug passed through a chain of pos-
session from the manufacturer, to the wholesaler, to the retailer, to the physician,
hospital or pharmacy and finally, to the patient. 26 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 607 P.2d at
929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
66. Id.
67. As was previously stated, the exact number of drug companies that manu-
factured DES is uncertain. See note 7 supra. However, the Sindell court used the
number 200 in its discussion of the number of potential manufacturer-defendants
in DES cases. 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39. For the
purpose of consistency, this note will use the Sindell court's assumption of the
number of manufacturer-defendants.
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remote to require each respondent to exonerate itself, especially
with the substantial possibility that the actual offending manufac-
turer might escape liability altogether.68 Thus, the court refused
to apply the Summers theory of alternative liability.
B. Concert of Action
1. History
Concert of action is another theory by which a plaintiff may ob-
tain joint and several liability.69 A typical illustration is that of an
illegal drag race in which a bystander is injured by one of the par-
ticipants.7 0 Suppose A, B, and C enter into such a race, and P is
injured by A's car. Under the concert of action theory, P may sue
A, B, C or any combination of the three.7 1
Prosser defined the concert of action rule as follows:
All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tor-
tious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or
who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his
acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with him.72
Thus, in the above example, all P need do is show that "each de-
fendant he has joined helped plan and facilitate the race, that the
participation of each was tortious, and that his injury resulted
from the race." 73 It should be noted that the participants of the
race may still be held under the concert of action theory even
though they did not expressly agree to participate in it; "all that is
required is that there be a tacit understanding. . . ."74 It is also
noteworthy that the definition of "joint tortfeasors" with relation
to concerted action applies not only to those who act in concert to
accomplish some common goal or plan and thereby cause injury,
but also to "those who order, direct or permit others to do the act,
and who give assistance or encouragement. ' 75 This theory of lia-
bility is accepted without dispute in California. 76
68. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
69. Fordham Comment, supra note 7, at 978.
70. E.g., Bierczyaski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); Skroh v. Newby, 237
So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Agovino v. Kunze, 181 Cal. App. 2d 591, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1960). See also 36 A.T.L.A. L.J. 75 (1976).
71. Fordham Comment, mupra note 7, at 979.
72. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 292 (citation omitted). See also Prosser, supra
note 40, at 429-30.
73. Fordham Comment, supra note 7, at 979.
74. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 292 (citation omitted).
75. 4 WrrIm, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS 2329-30 (8th ed. 1974).
76. See, e.g., Pasadena Unifiled School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72
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Orser v. George,77 relied on by the appellant in Sindell, explains
the rationale for the use of the concert of action theory as a
means to establish the element of causation. In Orser, three de-
fendants were engaged in the tortious conduct of firing their guns
in the direction of the decedent. Two of the three were al-
ternately firing a pistol which was later determined to be the
weapon that killed the decedent. The third defendant was shoot-
ing a rifle, which was not the fatal weapon. The trial court
granted the third defendant summary judgment on the basis that
he met the alternative liability burden of proof in showing that he
was not the responsible defendant. The court of appeal reversed
on the issue of whether the third defendant's tortious conduct in
firing the rifle in the direction of the decedent had provided the
other defendants with the "substantial 'assistance and encourage-
ment' " necessary for concert of action liability.78
Orser effectively demonstrates the distinction and the added el-
ement involved in concert of action as opposed to alternative lia-
bility. If a defendant can be shown to have joined with others to
facilitate an injurious result, it is irrelevant whether or not he can
subsequently meet the burden of proof by showing that he was
not personally responsible. Under the concert of action theory,
the act of joining in or encouraging tortious conduct is in itself
tortious.
The close relationship between concert of action and enterprise
liability is shown in Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc. 79
Hall involved injuries to thirteen children by dynamite blast
caps. The evidence of individual manufacturers was destroyed by
the explosions. 80 Alleging that the defendants knew that blasting
caps were dangerous and agreed among themselves not to put
warnings on the labels,81 the plaintiffs sued the six major manu-
facturers of blasting caps and the industry's trade association. Al-
though Hall was not decided on concert of action, the language
used by the court forms a basis for the enterprise theory of liabil-
ity. Accordingly, Hall will be discussed more fully below. 8 2
2. The Sindell Analysis of Concert of Action
The court first addressed the appellant's charge that the respon-
Cal. App. 3d 100, 113, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1971); Loeb v. Kimmerle, 214 Cal. 143, 150, 9
P. 2d 199 (1932).
77. 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, sub nom. Orser v. Vierra, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967).
78. Id. at 668, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
79. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
80. Id. at 378.
81. Id. at 359.
82. See notes 87-89 infra and accompanying text.
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dent's parallel- or imitative conduct in their testing and promotion,
methods was in itself tortious conduct. The court rejected this
contention by pointing out that it is common for manufacturers to
borrow testing and sales techniques from other manufacturers in
the same industry. Thus, the court refused to set any precedent
that might "render virtually any manufacturer liable for the de-
fective products of an entire industry. '83 This was the major rea-
son for the court's rejection of the concert of action theory, since,
in the court's view, its application in this context would have ex-
panded liability much further than had ever been intended.8 4
The court also distinguished the DES cases from prior concert
of action cases cited by the appellant.85 In particular, the court
sought to distinguish Orser. The decision in Orser was based on
the encouragement and assistance given by one of the alleged
tortfeasors to the other. However, there was no allegation made
by the appellant in Sindell that each respondent knew of the
other's tortious conduct, or that they assisted and encouraged one
another to inadequately test DES and to provide inadequate
warnings in the same manner as in Orser.86 Thus, the theory of
concerted action was rejected.
C. Enterprise Liability
1. History
The concept of enterprise liability was first introduced in Hall v.
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc..87 Though Hall and its com-
panion cases were decided on other grounds, 88 the court sug-
83. 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
84. Id.
85. The appellant cited the following cases in support of her concert of action
cause of action: Loeb v. Kimmerle, 215 Cal. 143, 9 P.2d 199 (1932) (defendants held
jointly liable for assault); Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 196 P. 25 (1921) (hus-
band and wife held liable for wrongful diversion of flood waters); Agovino v.
Kunze, 181 Cal. App. 2d 591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1960) (participants in drag race all
held liable); Meyer v. Thomas, 18 Cal. App. 2d 299, 63 P.2d 1176 (1936) (defendants
liable for conversion of a note and deed of trust). These cases all involved a small
number of ascertainable defendants whose concerted action resulted in a tort
against a single plailntiff, usually over a short span of time. 26 Cal. 3d at 606, 607
P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. The court distinguished these cases from the
more complicated fact situation found in Sindell. Id.
86. 26 Cal. 3d at 606, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
87. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See note 79 supra and accompanying
text.
88. Hall was actually one of two companion cases, each of which involved sev-
eral joined plaintiffs. Chance v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353
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gested an expansion of the concert of action theory to include
corporate entities, and referred to this expansion as "enterprise
liability." In Hall, the defendants had adhered to an industry-
wide standard with regard to safety design, labelling and manu-
facture of the blasting caps. Thus, it appeared that the defend-
ants jointly controlled the risk of injury. If shown by the plaintiffs
that the caps were manufactured by one of the defendants, the
burden of proof would shift to the defendants.8 9
This novel theory of liability was developed and refined by
Naomi Sheiner, while a law student at Fordham University9o for
use within the context of DES actions. In DES and a Proposed
Theory of Enterprise Liability, Sheiner proposed that enterprise
liability "combines the better features of concert [of action] and
alternative liability into one coherent theory."9 1 The elements of
the theory as outlined in the article are as follows:
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative agent
and such liability is due to the nature of the defendant's conduct.
2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the
defendants.
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect.
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a mem-
ber.
5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was
caused by the product of some one of the defendants. For example,
the joined defendants accounted for a high percentage of such defec-
tive products on the market at the time of plaintiff's injury.
6) There existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard of safety as to
the manufacture of this product.
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of which-
ever cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, or strict liabil-
ity.9
2
"Once [the] plaintiff proves these seven elements, the burden of
proof as to causation shifts to [the] defendants, each of which can
exonerate itself by showing ... that its product could not have
(E.D.N.Y. 1972). The Hall court held that the plaintiff's allegations of joint knowl-
edge and action were sufficient to maintain a cause of action against the defend-
ants. However, the various cases involved were subsequently severed and
transferred to the federal district courts in the states where the accidents had oc-
curred. None of the severed cases dealt with the issue of enterprise liability. In
two of these cases, the statute of limitations had run. Lehtonen v. E. I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 389 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mont. 1975) (motion to dismiss granted);
Davis v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (sum-
mary judgment granted). In the third case, the sixth circuit affirmed a jury verdict
which rejected the plaintiff's negligence claim. The court also affirmed the lower
court's directed verdict for the defendant on the strict liability claim on grounds
unrelated to enterprise liability because the manufacturer was not identifiable.
Ball v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1975).
89. 345 F. Supp. at 374.
90. Ms. Sheiner is presently an associate at the law firm of Hughes, Hubbard
and Reed in New York City.
91. Fordham Comment, supra note 7, at 995.
92. Id.
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been the one which injured this particular plaintiff."93
Enterprise liability is similar to alternative liability in that it
presumes that one of the defendants caused the plaintiff's injury,
and because of the tortious acts of all defendants coupled with
the plaintiffs inability to identify the one who caused the injury,
the burden is shifted to the defendant to exculpate himself if he
is able.94 Like concert of action, the "plaintiff must prove an addi-
tional element in enterprise liability, . . . , one that is derived
from the concerted activities of the defendants: [the presence of]
an insufficient industrywide safety standard."95 In addition to the
Restatement's theory of concert of action and the Summers rule
of alternative liability, Sheiner, in developing this proposed the-
ory of liability, relied on both Hall and Ybarra for authority.96
The primary rationale that Sheiner advances for enterprise lia-
bility is the familiar policy generally found in strict liability cases:
"That as between the innocent plaintiff and the tortfeasors, the
tortfeasors should bear the cost of the injury."97 Sheiner relies on
the policy considerations of the doctrine of respondeat superior
and strict liability, which involve a deliberate allocation of risk to
those in the best position to take preventative measures and to
absorb and distribute foreseeable costs to the public.98 In particu-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 996.
95. Id. at 997.
96. Id. "Hall's major contribution is ... that it ... provided a rationale for a
theory of industry-wide liability." Id. at 997. See notes 86-88 supra and accompa-
nying text. "Ybarra is noteworthy because ... the court seemed to justify its
finding of causation on the grounds of alternative liability and concert [of action]
... in a res ipsa loquitur context." Id. at 999. See also notes 52-55 supra and ac-
companying text.
97. Fordham Comment, supra note 7, at 1000. This, of course, is the familiar
policy argument advanced by the court in Summers and Ybarra. See notes 43-55
supra and accompanying text.
This rule is summarized in Holtz v. Holder, 101 Ariz. 247, 251, 418 P.2d 584, 588
(1966) (en banc) as follows:
The 'single injury' rule is based on the proposition that it is more desira-
ble, as a matter of policy, for an injured and innocent plaintiff to recover
his entire damages jointly and severally from independent tortfeasors, one
of whom may have to pay more than his just share, than it is to let two or
more wrongdoers escape liability altogether, simply because the plaintiff
cannot carry the impossible burden of proving the respective shares of
causation or because the tortfeasors have not committed a joint tort.
Id.
98. Fordham Comment, supra note 7, at 1001-02. The doctrine of respondeat
superior holds a master liable for the torts of his servant even though the master
is not in privity with the injured third party and is innocent of any tortious behav-
1029
lar, reliance is placed on the landmark decision of Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co. ,99 which developed the theory of strict liability
in response to the scientific and industrial advances of the time.
The Sheiner article suggests that it is now time to advance still
another, more far-reaching form of liability. l0 0
2. Sindell Analysis of Enterprise Liability
The Sindell court rejected the theory of enterprise liability, at
least in form.101 The court distinguished Sindell from Hall by
pointing out that in the latter there were only six manufacturers
which represented the blasting cap industry in the United
States; 10 2 there are at least 200 manufacturers of DES, of which
only five were named in Sindell. Moreover, in Hall, the defend-
ants jointly controlled the risk of injury through a trade associa-
tion; however, in Sindell, proof of control of risk would not be
shown by such means.103
The court also advanced the policy reason that the drug indus-
try, because of its close affiliation with the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, should not be held completely responsible for its
industry-wide standards, since those standards are dictated by
the government. 0 4 In its analysis, however, the court failed to
consider the fact that although the FDA set the standards for the
ior. See HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1 (1956). The theory of strict lia-
bility holds that once causation is proven, the manufacturer is liable even though
he has exercised all possible care and entered into no contractual relationship
with the user of the product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (a)
(1965). See also Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517 (1961); Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951),
reprinted in 54 CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1472-74 (1966); Morris, Hazardous Enterprised
and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172, 1175-79 (1952).
99. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
100. Fordham Comment, supra note 7, at 1002.
Technological advances now allow an entire industry to manufacture a
complex fungible product, modern scientific research can link contact with
this product to harmful effects after a significant lapse of time. Since
these advances now make identification of the injury-producing product
inaccessible to the consumer, the manufacturer's obligation to the con-
sumer can only be met by some new form of liability.
Id.
101. The Sindell court preferred to develop its own basis for liability in DES
cases rather than apply the enterprise theory because of the differing rationales.
Enterprise liability imposes manufacturer liability solely because the manufac-
turer followed the standards of the industry. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court preferred to hold the Sindell defendants liable for the
policy reasons outlined in notes 105-127 infra and accompanying text.
102. 26 Cal. 3d at 607, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142. The court does con-
cede, however, that the caps could have been supplied by a cap manufacturer. Id.
103. Id. Apparently, enterprise liability, as interpreted by the Sindell court, re-
quires tangible evidence of the defendant's participation in the unsafe industry-
wide practices.
104. Id. at 609-10, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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manufacture and distribution of DES, the manufacturers of the
drug failed to follow these standards.105
Thus, the court rejected, rather summarily, the third theory of
liability offered by the appellant. However, as will be seen below,
while the court rejected enterprise liability in form, the substance
is strikingly similar to the theory of "market share" liability that
the court developed sua sponte.
IV. MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
Although the court deemed the three theories of liability ad-
vanced by Sindell insufficient to warrant a cause of action, the
court nevertheless held that the appellant should not be pre-
cluded from recovery.106 The court stated that "the response of
the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, deny-
ing recovery to those injured by such products, or to fashion rem-
edies to meet these changing needs.' 07 Therefore, based on
major policy considerations, the court established a new theory of
causation applicable to a limited number of cases.
Primary authority for "market share" liability was Justice Tray-
nor's landmark concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. ,108 which over thirty years ago recognized the then traditional
standard of negligence as insufficient to govern the obligations
owed by the manufacturer to the consumer. 09 As in Escola, the
policy argument that the manufacturer is better able to bear the
cost of an injury resulting from a defective product was also
stressed by the Sindell court." 0 It was reasoned in Sindell that
from a policy standpoint, holding a manufacturer liable for de-
fects in their products and for the failure to warn of harmful ef-
fects, even in the absence of proof of causation, would provide an
incentive for product safety, since the manufacturer would be in
the best position to guard against such defects."'
105. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
106. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. This policy argument has
been relied upon in other decisions as well. See note 98 supra and accompanying
text.
111. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. See Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Beech Air-
craft Corp. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 3d 501, 132 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976). The court
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Although the Sindell court rejected the theories of alternative
liability, concert of action, and enterprise liability, it nevertheless
borrowed heavily from each of these theories in its formulation of
"market share" liability. In its rejection of alternative liability
and concert of action, the court apparently preferred not to ex-
pand either of these established tort doctrines to the extent that
would be necessary in the Sindell factual setting.iX2 In contrast,
enterprise liability, which is more of a proposed theory than an
established doctrine,1 13 was relied on very heavily by the court in
the adopted "market share" theory."i 4
The major difference between the three theories of liability pro-
posed by the appellant and the "market share" theory formulated
by the court, is that "market share", rather than imposing joint
and several liability, imposes only several liability on the defend-
ants. Accordingly, no manufacturer may be held liable for 100
percent of the judgment. Instead, "each defendant will be held lia-
ble for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of
that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made
the product which caused plaintiffs' injuries.""15 Although the
court uses the term "market share" to literally mean "the propor-
tion of the judgment represented by [that defendant's] share of
that market,""l 6 the court did not state exactly how a defendant's
states that these policy considerations are particularly significant in cases involv-
ing medication, since the consumer is virtually helpless in protecting himself from
serious, sometimes permanent or fatal injuries caused by defective drugs. 26 Cal.
3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
112. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Both the alternative liability
theory and the concert of action theory have traditionally been applied in rela-
tively uncomplicated tort actions between private individuals and where the spe-
cific tortfeasor could not be identified. See, e.g., notes 43-50, 70, 85 supra and
accompanying text. The Sindell factual setting, by contrast, deals with corporate
defendants in a much more complicated situation, with added elements such as
the great time lapse, number of potential defendants, and significant continuing
injuries involved. Thus, the court preferred to advance a new theory of liability
based on the rationales of alternative liability and concert of action.
113. See notes 90-101 supra and accompanying text.
114. Although the Sindell court purports to have rejected the enterprise theory
of liability, its "market share" theory of liability is barely distinguishable. See
notes 101-06 supra and accompanying text. In fact, the one distinguishing factor,
the market share apportionment scheme, was suggested in the Comment, supra
note 7, which stated that "much of the strength and justice of enterprise liability
rests in the suggestion that damages be apportioned among defendants in propor-
tion to their market shares." Id. at 999. However, this was merely a suggestion,
with the author subsequently acknowledging that enterprise liability actually re-
sults in joint and several liability, with each defendant liable for the entire
amount of the damages. Id.
115. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
116. Id. The court uses an illustration from the Comment, supra note 7, to ex-
plain the connection between percentage of market share and liability:
[I] f X Manufacturer sold one-fifth of all the DES prescribed for pregnancy
and identification could be made in all cases, X would be the sole defend-
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share of the market would be determined.l17
The court recognized that some discrepancy between the "mar-
ket share" apportioned to a defendant and the actual liability of
that defendant is inevitable, primarily because of the passage of
time involved.118 However, the court likened this problem to the
inability of a jury to precisely determine the relation between
fault and liability under the doctrines of comparative fault 1 9 or
partial indemnity.120 In practice, it would seem that a defendant's
portion of the market would be more easily defined, because of
company records of sales and profits, than a particular defend-
ant's comparative fault in, for example, a multiple-vehicle acci-
dent case, which would necessarily be a more subjective
determination because of the lack of factual basis.
The other major problem with the "market share" theory, is
that all the potential defendants may not be named. The Sindell
court concluded, however, that this was not a major obstacle in
this case, since the five named respondents represented approxi-
mately ninety percent of the entire market.121 Thus, there was
only a ten percent likelihood that the offending producer would
ant in approximately one-fifth of all cases and liable for all the damages in
those cases. Under alternative liability, X would be joined in all cases in
which identification could not be made, but liable for only one-fifth of the
total damages in these cases. X would pay the same amount either way.
Although the correlation is not, in practice, perfect, it is close enough so
that defendants' objections on the ground of fairness lose their value.
26 Cal. 3d at 612 n.28, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing Comment, supra note 7, at 994).
117. Although the court fails to outline a specific method in which a defendant's
portion of the market may be determined, it is assumed that each defendant's
market share will be determined according to the percentage of the market it held
as evidenced by records of sales and profits. While many of the drug companies
involved in DES suits maintain that it is virtually impossible to recreate the mar-
ket and to determine market share, some of the less vulnerable defendants have
ventured a guess. For example, counsel for Rexall has estimated that it held
"under one-tenth of 1 percent of the market." Bruck, supra note 13, at 18. (quoting
Ted Grashof, counsel for Rexall).
118. 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147. For example, it may
be difficult to determine a particular manufacturer's exact percentage of market
share in a particular year and in a particular jurisdiction, when the relevant time
period is 20 years in the past. An additional problem may be in identifying the
particular purpose for which the defendant's drug was sold. See note 10 supra.
119. 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147. See Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., Cal. 3d 809, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
120. 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147. See American Motor-
cycle Assn. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal Rptr. 182 (1978).
121. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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escape liability.122 The court, therefore, gave the appellant the in-
itial burden of joining a "substantial percentage" of the manufac-
turers in bringing an action based on "market share" liability.
However, the court did not determine what constituted a "sub-
stantial percentage," except to state that in the instant case that
the appellant met the burden.123
Though the court readily acknowledged the above potential pro-
cedural and equitable problems with the theory, it viewed these
as relatively minor, considering the alternative of leaving the ap-
pellant without a remedy. 24 Thus, it appears that the Sindell
court, without specifying it as such, facilitated a type of balancing
test in its adoption of "market share" recovery; inconsistencies in-
herent in the determination of a "substantial percentage" or
"market share" are outweighed by the necessity of providing in-
nocent plaintiffs' with an avenue of recovery.
V. THE DISSENT
A strong dissent, written by Justice Richardson, began by stat-
ing that the ramifications of the "market share" theory adopted by
the court were virtually limitless, with the "elimination of the bur-
den of proof as to the identification [of the manufacturer whose
drug injured plaintiff imposing] ... a liability that would exceed
absolute liability."'125 Justice Richardson cited briefly the prevail-
ing authority on tort law,126 as well as other DES cases 127 in sup-
122. Id. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
123. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The Comment, supra
note 7, at 996 suggested that 75 to 80 % of the market be the requirement for a
substantial percentage. The court, however, preferred not to quantify the term
"substantial percentage" to a specific number. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 145.
124. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
125. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting
opinion) (citing Coggins, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SuFFOLK L. REV. 980, 998
(1979) (citation omitted)).
126. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting
opinion).
It is clear that any holding that a producer, manufacturer, seller, or a per-
son in a similar position, is liable for injury caused by a particular product
must necessarily be predicated upon proof that the product in question
was one for whose condition the defendant was in some way responsible.
Thus, for example, if recovery is sought from a manufacturer, it must be
shown that he actually was the manufacturer of the product which caused
the injury....
Id. (citing 1 HURSH & BATTEY, AMERIcAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILrTY, § 1:41 at 125
(2d ed. 1974)); accord, PROSSER, supra note 37, at 671-72; 2 DOOLEY, MODERN TORT
LAW, § 32.03 at 243 (1977).
127. Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McCreery v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978). The dissent relied on these
two earlier cases which held that absent identification of a specific liable manufac-
turer, DES plaintiffs could not maintain a cause of action.
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port of this position.
The dissent painstakingly examined the majority's decision,
showing, one by one, the problems inherent in the "market share"
theory. First, although the court stated that the requirement of
proof is satisfied by joinder of those defendants who have to-
gether manufactured a "substantial share" of the market, 128 it
failed to establish a guideline or method of determining what con-
stitutes a "substantial share. ' 129 Although the dissent believed
that this should have been specifically determined by the court,
the dissent did not appear to consider this a major deficiency in
the decision compared to the other problems with "market share"
recovery.130
More significantly, the dissent was concerned with the conse-
quences of what it terms the "unprecedented extension of liabil-
ity" advanced by the theory.131 For example, a particular
defendant, having a very small share of the relevant market, could
"be held proportionately liable even though mathematically it is
much more likely than not that it played no role whatever in caus-
ing plaintiff's injuries."'1 32 This would allow the plaintiff to "pick
and choose their targets,"'133 with the defendants, who are held to
be liable, named according to whatever method the plaintiff
chooses, rather than by the possibility or likelihood of liability.
While this may be a legitimate concern, it seems more likely that
a potential plaintiff unable to identify a responsible defendant
would name those companies most readily identified as DES
manufacturers, with a corresponding large share of the market,
rather than those minor companies who participated in an ex-
tremely small portion of the market.134
128. 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting
opinion).
133. Id.
134. An example of this may be found in McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal.
App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978). The plaintiff named Eli Lilly & Company as
the defendant in the action, but discovery showed that plaintiff could not name the
responsible manufacturer and had based her allegation on the 1970 Physician's
Desk Reference, which listed Lilly as the only manufacturer of diethylstilbestrol.
Id. at 80, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 732. It is generally acknowledged that Lilly has a "gi-
ant's share" of the market. Bruck, supra note 13, at 18. Although the plaintiff
could not prove the responsible manufacturer, she named the one that was more
likely to have produced the responsible drug, rather than name a company with
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The dissent also pointed out the practical consideration of the
disproportionate impact on those manufacturers who are amena-
ble to suit in California, since it is possible that no other state will
adopt the market share theory.135 In this situation, those manu-
facturers brought to trial in California would be, in effect, jointly
responsible for 100 percent of plaintiffs' injuries although those
manufacturers " 'substantial' aggregate market share may be con-
siderably less."136
Finally, the dissent criticized the theory as contrary to the so-
cial policy that encourages the development of new pharmaceuti-
cal drugs. Justice Richardson reasoned that the decision of
liability based on market share would "inevitably inhibit, if not
the research or development, at least the dissemination of new
pharmaceutical drugs."137 This, he stated, was totally inconsistent
with the policy of traditional tort theory as advanced in the Re-
statement. 13 8 While Justice Richardson's view is shared by sev-
eral authorities,139 it has been controverted by others. 40 This
conflict of opinion will be discussed more fully below.' 4 1
only a small share of the market. McCreery does show, however, that the dissent
is correct in stating that plaintiffs used varying methods in choosing which defend-
ants to name in an action./
135. 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting opinion). While no other state has specifically adopted the Sindell "mar-
ket share" theory at the date of this writing, other states have held for the plaintiff
in DES cases under the joint and several theories of liability. See note 2 supra
and accompanying text.
136. 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting opinion).
137. Id. at 620, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (Richardson, J., dissenting
opinion).
138. Id. The specific section that the dissent refers to is § 402 A, comment k,
which states in relevant part:
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to
which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical expe-
rience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of
ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and
use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller
of such products, again, with the qualification that they are properly pre-
pared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation
calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the pub-
lic with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402 A, comment k (1965).
139. See Coggins, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SuFFoLK L. REV. 980 (1979); Birn-
baum, Market Share Liability Under California's Sindell DES Decision, Nat'l L. J.,
May, 19, 1980, at 26 [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum].
140. See Comment, supra note 7; Lambert, From the Editor's Scratch Pad, 23
A.T.L.A. L. REv. 194 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Lambert]; Nordstrom, Causation
• Its Many Faces, L.A. TRAL. L. 8A. ADVOCATE 1, No. 5 (May, 1980) (hereinafter
cited as Nordstrom].
141. See notes 152-54 infra and accompanying text.
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The dissent concluded by suggesting, in view of the sweeping
possibilities of the market share theory as applied to other areas
of business and commercial activity, that this extreme departure
from traditional tort law should only be undertaken, if at all, by
the legislature.1 42
VI. IMPACT OF SINDELL
A. Problems with "Market Share" Liability
Authorities in the field of products liability disagree as to the
long-term impact of the Sindell ruling;143 however, it is generally
agreed that the decision, although limited, poses potential proce-
dural problems.
The first apparent problem with the "market share" approach is
that all potential defendants need not be named. Only a "sub-
stantial share" or percentage of the total possible defendants
must be named.'"4 This not only raises the practical problem of
determining what a "substantial share" of the market is, but also
leaves the possibility that the actual tortious manufacturer would
not be named. In this situation, the "substantial share" of manu-
facturers, rather than the responsible tortfeasor, would pay for
the plaintiffs injuries.
Although the Sindell court did not believe that this would be a
major problem,1 45 its failure to give a guideline for determining
what is a "substantial share" of a market has created potential
problems. The lack of foresight by the court in creating a novel
142. 26 Cal. 3d at 621, 607 P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting opinion). The court addressed this suggestion of the dissent in a footnote
stating that "as a principle, [we do not see] any justification for shifting the
financial burden for such damages from drug manufacturers to the taxpayers of
California." 26 Cal. 3d at 613 n.30, 607 P.2d at 938 n.30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 n.30.
143. For example, Sheila Birnbaum, Professor of Law at New York University
School of Law, states: 'The shock waves of Sindell have already had an impact on
other industries ... indeed, [Sindell] is only 'the tip of the iceberg' in the contin-
ued expansion of product liability law." Birnbaum, supra note 139, at 27. How-
ever, Paul Rheingold, the New York City attorney that filed the first DES lawsuit
in 1974, Rheingold v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 74 Civil 3420 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14,
1975), on behalf of his daughter, believes that Sindell may not have a very far-
reaching impact with regard to other areas of products liability because few prod-
ucts liability cases involve serious questions of defendant identification. Podgers,
66 A.B.A.J. 827 (July, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Podgers].
144. 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting opinion).
145. Id. at 612-23, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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theory of liability without following up on the practical applica-
tion of the theory has, perhaps unnecessarily, exposed the deci-
sion to criticism. A related problem is the failure of the court to
explain a method of determining the "market share" of a defend-
ant.146
One potential procedural problem not discussed by either the
majority or the dissent is whether a finding of "market share" lia-
bility may collaterally estop an entire industry from denying lia-
bility.147 Collateral estoppel has recently been ruled a proper
pleading vehicle in products liability cases.1 8 However, these de-
cisions do not address the possibility of collaterally estopping
manufacturers of a generic product who have not personally had
their day in court. In view of the generic quality of DES, as well
as the limited scope of "market share" applicability,149 it is doubt-
ful that this issue presents a serious problem.
Apart from the aforementioned procedural problems in Sindell,
there are equitable drawbacks inherent in the "market share"
theory. One of the most serious of these appears to be the prob-
lem with the apportionment of damages. For example, in cases
where the plaintiff cannot name the responsible defendant, such
as was the situation in Sindell, "market share" liability will be
evoked. However, in those cases where the plaintiff is able to
name the responsible manufacturer that caused her injuries, it is
assumed that the plaintiff will retain the burden of proof as to the
single defendant, rather than naming several defendants and pro-
ceeding under a "market share" theory15 0 For example, in case 1,
if the plaintiff is able to identify a specific responsible manufac-
turer, the plaintiff will retain the burden of proof, with the single
146. See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text.
147. Birnbaum, supra note 139, at 27.
148. See Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979); Katz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Burke, Judge Lets Lawyers in Federal
Suit Depose Jurors on State Court Verdict, Nat'l L. J., December 17, 1978 at 6.
Bruek, Plaintif's Win Three Key Victories, Des Suits, AM. LAW, Nov. 1979, at 10.
149. See notes 163-66 infra and accompanying text.
150. Defendant Abbott Laboratories, in its petition for rehearing to the
Supreme Court of California, stated that this example had occurred in Sindell:
The two cases now before the Court provide a limited illustration of the
fallacy of this assumption and the inequities that would result from its
use. While the Court has assumed that the plaintiff Sindell has no identi-
fication evidence, the plaintiff Rogers alleges that Eli Lilly & Company
made the alleged injury-causing product in her case. If both plaintiffs are
correct and if they succeed in proving every other element of the tort,
then Lilly would pay 100% of Rogers' damages, plus a market share por-
tion of Sindell's damages. It is patently obvious that Lilly's total liability
in the two cases will not reflect its share of the market, but far exceed it.
Petition of Abbott Laboratories For Rehearing at, 7-8, Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (rehearing denied May 7,
1980).
1038
[Vol. 8: 1011, 1981] Expanding Tort Liability
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
defendant paying 100 percent of the judgment. However, in case
2, if the plaintiff is unable to name the responsible manufacturer,
she will name several and proceed on the basis of "market share"
liability. If one manufacturer is named in both case 1 and case 2,
that manufacturer-defendant will be forced to pay 100 percent of
one judgment and a market share percentage in another. Thus,
this combined liability will force that one manufacturer-defendant
to bear a much greater burden than its actual market share.
As pointed out by the dissent, the above example would partic-
ularly become a problem if jurisdictions other than California fail
to adopt the "market share" theory as advanced by the Sindell
court. In this situation, those manufacturers more amenable to
suit in California would be held to a disproportionate share of
damages.1 5 1
The final major problem with the "market share" theory is the
concern that the pharmaceutical industry may be undermined by,
in effect, making it the insurer of all defective drugs of uncertain
origin. 5 2 Critics of the Sindell decision believe, as was stated in
the dissent, that the theory will inhibit the dissemination of
drugs, which is contrary to the public policy considerations ad-
vanced in the Restatement. 15 3 A close look at the wording of the
Restatement cited by the dissent, however, will show that these
policy considerations do not apply to the facts of the Sindell case.
The Restatement states that public policy justifies the use of
new or experimental drugs, despite medically recognizable risks,
and that the manufacturer of such a drug will not be held strictly
liable for subsequent injuries caused by the drug. However, this
applies to manufacturers who are held strictly liable, and only ap-
plies when the drug is properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning given. 5 4 In contrast, Sindell sued the various re-
spondents for their negligence in failing to properly market, test,
and warn of the inherent dangers in the use of DES.
Therefore, it appears that the Sindell court, rather than holding
the drug industry liable for all injuries that occur as a result of a
drug previously thought to be safe, has only suggested that those
manufacturers who are shown to have been negligent in their
marketing or testing of a drug should be held liable for the conse-
151. 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
152. Id. at 621, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
153. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
154. Id.
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quences of their negligent acts. Rather than discouraging the dis-
semination of modern drugs, this policy should serve to
encourage their safe testing, marketing, and utilization.
B. Benefits of "Market Share" Liability
The major advantage of "market share" liability is the equitable
policy repeated throughout the Sindell decision. It is "preferable
to hold liable a negligent defendant who did not in fact cause the
injury than to deny an innocent plaintiff a remedy when it cannot
be determined which of the defendants is responsible for the
harm but it appears that one of them was." 155 This same general
policy is the basis for virtually all of the major advances in the
field of products liability in recent years.15 6
Sindell was innocent of any wrongdoing, yet suffered serious in-
jury. Although she could not name the manufacturer that pro-
duced the DES that caused her specific injury, she named several
manufacturers, and alleged that all of them negligently produced
the carcinogenic drug. If the Sindell court had not allowed the
appellant to maintain her action, the result would have been that
the victims of DES would have borne the cost of their injuries
while the tortious manufacturers would have avoided liability. As
has been stated so often by the courts, the cost of these injuries is
much better borne by the manufacturers, who have the potential
to guard against such dangers, than by the innocent victims of
their mistakes. 5 7
C. The Potential Application of "Market Share"
It is clear that California's "market share" apportionment the-
ory is affecting almost immediately other DES cases pending in
other courts. For example, in May of 1980, only one month after
the Sindell ruling, a Cleveland woman settled out of court with
four separate DES manufacturers for a total of two million dol-
lars.15 8 This immediate result is not unexpected. After the
155. Vasquez v. Alameda, 49 Cal. 2d 674, 682-83, 321 P.2d 1, 7 (1958) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting opinion).
156. See notes 43-55, 98, 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
157. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
158. Cindy Dettelbach, of University Heights, Ohio, underwent surgery for vagi-
nal cancer in February, 1976, at the age of 19. She will never be able to have chil-
dren, faces the possibility of similar cancer developing and must be tested for
cancer every six months. She filed a five million dollar lawsuit in federal district
court in March of 1976 and, in wording similar to the Sindell allegations, has
named Eli Lilly, Merck & Co., E.R. Squibb & Sons, and the Upjohn Co. as defend-
ants. Less than a month after the Sindell ruling, the defendant companies settled
for $260,000.00. L.A. Daily J., May 9, 1980, at 3, col. 8.
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Sindell decision, 5 9 one defense attorney involved in DES litiga-
tion stated that "the Sindell case is a major victory for the plain-
tiffs' bar. Especially since California traditionally is in the
vanguard of tort litigation, Sindell might represent a watershed in
terms of a trend for the future."160 This seems to be the general
consensus among both plaintiff and defense attorneys, 161 espe-
cially since the United States Supreme Court has denied the writ
of certiorari sought by the Sindell respondents.162
If, as is expected, the Sindell decision sparks a rash of suits
based on "market share" liability, it may be advantageous for the
drug companies to unite, develop a proportional scheme based on
the market, and begin to organize efficient and expeditious settle-
ments with DES plaintiffs. 63 Although this type of organization
would be enormously expensive and administratively compli-
cated, it would be beneficial to all parties in the long run. A plain-
tiff would be compensated sooner, and although she would
possibly receive a lesser amount of recovery, the legal entangel-
ments of lengthy litigation would be avoided. The defendants, al-
though forced to pay damages in all cases, would save
tremendous litigation expenses. 16 4 This will especially be true if
other jurisdictions follow the lead of Sindell, since without the ne-
cessity of the plaintiff identifying a specific defendant, defense
verdicts would be rare. Finally, the advantage of mass settlement
and avoidance of unnecessary and protracted litigation would be
beneficial in promoting judicial efficiency by helping to alleviate
the existing court backlogs around the country.
In regard to the further application of Sindell to other areas of
tort litigation, the repercussions will be necessarily minimal be-
cause of the relatively few types of products liability cases that
involve serious problems of defendant identification. The Sindell
court limited itself in its application of "market share" liability to
159. See note 20 supra.
160. Bruck, supra note 13, at 18 (quoting Henry Simon, National DES counsel
for Schering).
161. See notes 140, 143 supra.
162. 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
163. Defense counsel involved in DES litigation held some preliminary settle-
ment talks in 1977, but abandoned the idea because of the money involved and the
administrative complications. Such negotiations show, however, that the drug
companies appreciated the risks involved in DES cases, but at that time were not
interested in settlement. Bruck, supra note 13, at 18. With the Sindell decision,
these settlement talks may reopen.
164. Id.
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only cases where a plaintiff has an identification problem due to
the generic quality of the product causing the injury.165 The court
further limited the theory by applying it, as an element of causa-
tion, only in those cases where the manufacturer is negligent. 66
Thus, the far-reaching impact feared by the critics of Sindell is
unlikely to occur.
However, in those few cases that involve the type of identifica-
tion problems found in DES cases, the application of the "market
share" theory will be almost immediate. The most obvious of
these cases are the more than 6,000 asbestos cases that are pend-
ing around the country. 67 The asbestos cases involve the factu-
ally analogous problem of a construction worker attempting to
prove not only the identity of each of his employers during the
twenty to thirty years of asbestos exposure, but also which manu-
facturer produced the asbestos products that were purchased by
or on behalf of those employers over such period of time. This
identity problem, similar to the DES cases, would without a "mar-
ket share" type of approach preclude any remedy. 68 Like DES
cases, asbestos litigation is similarly causing court backlogs
throughout the country. Therefore, the judicial system, faced
with such a problem, may welcome expeditious approaches to the
resolution of these cases as well.169
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that Sindell is a substantial expansion of products lia-
bility law. It is equally clear that this expansion is necessary to
meet the changing needs of society. It has been said that the life
of the law is a response to human needs. 70 The Sindell court, in
developing the "market share" theory of liability, has expanded
the law to adapt to the expansion of technology and industry in
today's advancing society.
Far from stifling the drug industry, the "market share" theory
should encourage more responsible testing and care in the devel-
opment of modern drugs. The Sindell decision does not call for
the pharmaceutical industry's guarantee of fool-proof drugs,
rather, it calls for a responsible attitude in their development.
This decision also avails the courts of an expeditious approach
to relieve court backlogs in cases where the liability is clear but
165. 26 Cal. 3d at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
166. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
167. Podgers, supra note 143.
168. Nordstrom, supra note 140.
169. Podgers, supra note 143.
170. Lambert, supra note 140.
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proof of causation as to a specific manufacturer is not. This deci-
sion should be a welcome answer to a practical problem felt by
many members of the legal profession in eliminating expensive,
time-consuming, and unnecessary litigation.
In conclusion, although some problems exist in the "market
share" theory of liability the benefits to be gained from its adop-
tion greatly outweigh any disadvantages. The inequities in the
decision are limited to those manufacturers responsible of inno-
cent plaintiffs.
N. DENISE TAYLOR
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